Non-Domination Beyond the Borders of the European Union: A Civic-Republican Blueprint for a European Security Perimeter Doctrine
Abstract
A European Union (EU) that cannot protect itself against external coercion will struggle to secure the material and civic conditions of freedom for its citizens. From a civic republican standpoint - where liberty is understood primarily as non-domination - external vulnerability is not merely a geopolitical inconvenience; it is a structural condition that enables arbitrary interference by other powers in Europe’s public choices. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine-Russia crisis have demonstrated the multidimensional vulnerability of the European Union.
This essay develops a philosophically grounded, institutionally explicit proposal for building the political, social, economic, and military foundations of a “European Security Perimeter Doctrine” or “European Anti-Coercion and Collective Defence Posture” (a “European Monroe doctrine” in a non-imperial, republican sense). It argues that the EU already possesses partial legal and policy foundations - mutual assistance, solidarity, a strategic compass, anti-coercion tools, defence industrial financing - but lacks a coherent constitutional architecture and civic settlement that would make these instruments both effective and republican (i.e., robustly constrained, contestable, and oriented to the common good rather than factional or executive discretion).
Many thanks to the lessons political philosophy at the University of Antwerp (UA), Belgium, Europe.
1. The Civic-Republican Problem: Security as a Condition of Freedom
Civic republicanism is a political tradition emphasizing that freedom is secured through active citizen participation, civic virtue, and the common good, rather than just non-interference. It prioritizes non-domination, rule of law, and opposing corruption.
Civic republicanism, in its modern articulation (e.g., Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit), defines liberty not as mere non-interference, but as freedom from subjection to arbitrary power - freedom as non-domination. On this view, citizens are free when no agent (domestic or foreign) can impose its will without being forced to track their interests under publicly controlled rules and institutions.
Two implications follow.
- External domination is a direct threat to internal self-government. If third powers can credibly coerce the European Union - militarily, economically, technologically, or through information manipulation - then EU and Member State choices become contingent on external permission. A polity that must constantly “look over its shoulder” is not self-ruling in the republican sense.
- Republican security is not maximal power; it is controlled power. The republican cure for domination is not an unconstrained executive or permanent emergency politics. It is publicly authorized capacity subject to checks, transparency, and contestation - power that can be used, limited, and reviewed under (high-quality) law.
A “European Security Perimeter Doctrine,” if republican, therefore has a double aim:
- outward-facing: deter and defeat coercion ;
- inward-facing: prevent Europe’s own security apparatus from becoming a source of arbitrary rule.
2. What the EU Already Has: Legal and Policy Building Blocks (Without Pretending They Are Enough)
Any reasonable proposal must begin with what is already instituted.
2.1 Treaty commitments: solidarity and mutual assistance
The EU’s constitutional order already contains two relevant solidarity mechanisms:
- Mutual assistance (armed aggression): Article 42 TEU includes a mutual assistance obligation if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression, while recognizing the specific security policies of some Member States and the role of NATO for those who rely on it.
- Solidarity clause (terrorism/disasters): Article 222 TFEU commits the Union and Member States to act jointly if a Member State suffers a terrorist attack or a natural/man-made disaster, including mobilising available instruments and (where provided) military resources.
These clauses establish that “collective protection” is not alien to the EU’s constitutional identity; the problem is operationalisation, coordination, and democratic control.
2.2 Strategic orientation: the Strategic Compass and operational deliverables
The European Council approved the Strategic Compass in March 2022 as an action plan to strengthen EU security and defence by 2030. A flagship deliverable is the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), conceived as a modular force “up to 5,000 troops,” intended to be fully operational by 2025, and presented by the European External Action Service (EEAS) as becoming operational in 2025.
2.3 Anti-coercion and economic security instruments
The EU has moved beyond the assumption that trade interdependence is always pacifying:
- The Anti-Coercion Instrument entered into force on 27 December 2023, providing a framework to respond to third-country economic coercion.
- The EU’s FDI screening framework exists under Regulation (EU) 2019/452.
2.4 Defence capability and industry mechanisms
The European Defence Fund (EDF) is established for 2021–2027 by Regulation (EU) 2021/697.
The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) provides a treaty-based structured cooperation mechanism in defence among participating Member States.
The European Peace Facility (EPF) was created by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 as an off-budget instrument supporting CFSP actions with military/defence implications.
In 2024–2025, the European Commission advanced a “Readiness 2030” approach (white paper framing) and the EU adopted Security Action for Europe (SAFE), a €150 billion instrument to support joint procurement and defence industrial production.
The Commission and High Representative also issued the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) in March 2024.
The materials exist. The republican question is: how to turn these instruments into a coherent constitutional posture that protects Europeans from domination without generating domination from within.
3. Reframing “European Monroe”: From Sphere-of-Influence to Anti-Domination Perimeter
“Monroe doctrine” language is normatively dangerous because it historically connotes exclusive spheres, paternalism toward neighbours, and unilateral intervention. A civic-republican adaptation must explicitly reject those implications.
A European Security Perimeter Doctrine, republicanly construed, should mean:
- Anti-coercion guarantee: Europe collectively resists coercion - military, economic, cyber, informational - aimed at forcing Member States (or the Union) into choices they would not freely endorse. (This is the external non-domination principle.)
- Perimeter as capacity + partnerships, not annexation: Europe invests in capabilities and resilient networks with neighbours by consent, not by hierarchy.
- Rule-governed escalation: The posture is credible only if adversaries can predict that coercion triggers proportionate, lawful, collectively authorized responses - rather than improvised executive discretion.
- Civic constraint: All security capacities remain subject to public justification, parliamentary scrutiny, judicial legality, and contestation.
The “perimeter” is thus not a cartographic empire; it is a zone of responsibility defined by (a) vulnerability to coercion, and (b) the EU’s duty to protect the civic conditions of its own citizens’ freedom.
4. Building the Foundations: A Four-Pillar Republican Construction
Pillar I - Political and Constitutional Foundations: Authorised Capacity Without Arbitrary Rule
A republican security posture requires institutions that can act fast, but not unaccountably. The EU’s recurrent failure is not only capability gaps; it is a legitimacy architecture that is simultaneously too fragmented for decisiveness and too intergovernmental for contestability.
I.1. A European Security Council (ESC) with parliamentary coupling
A feasible design is a compact decision body (e.g., an ESC) mandated to coordinate responses to coercion across instruments (sanctions, trade defence, cyber diplomacy, defence assistance, civil protection), but coupled to:
- mandatory ex post parliamentary review (European Parliament + national parliaments),
- transparency defaults (public legal bases, published rationales, time-limited classifications),
- and justiciable legality where EU law applies.
This addresses a classic republican problem: emergency powers must be institutionalised so they are neither paralysed nor arbitrary.
I.2. Operationalising Article 42(7) TEU through pre-commitment
Article 42(7) Treaty on European Union (TEU) is only as credible as the anticipatory planning behind it. A republican approach recommends:
- predefined menus of assistance (logistics, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), cyber defence, air policing, stockpiles, financing),
- agreed (realistic, trustworthy) thresholds for activation,
- and an EU-level “solidarity ledger” tracking contributions - reducing free-riding and factional bargaining under crisis pressure.
I.3. Contestability mechanisms (republican “anti-oligarchy”)
Civic republicanism is acutely sensitive to capture by elites. In security, capture risks are acute (industry lobbying, secrecy, fear politics). Countermeasures include:
- conflict-of-interest (COI) hardening for defence procurement decisions,
- a strengthened role for (competent) audit bodies (EU and national),
- and standing parliamentary security committees with access rights and oversight duties.
Pillar II - Social Foundations: Civic Resilience, Shared Burdens, and the Public Sphere
Republican freedom depends on citizens’ capacity to deliberate without manipulation and to sustain solidarity under stress.
II.1. A European Civic Resilience Compact
A perimeter doctrine must be “whole-of-society,” not as a slogan, but as an institutional programme:
- civil defence preparedness (shelters where relevant, continuity of government planning, reliable and resilient healthcare logistics),
- efficient and effective cross-border emergency coordination,
- and (standardized, safe and secure) interoperable crisis communications.
This builds on the logic of the solidarity clause (Article 222 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) beyond terrorism/disasters toward systemic resilience, while respecting competences.
II.2. Defending the epistemic commons against manipulation
Coercion increasingly targets the public sphere (disinformation, foreign information manipulation, electoral interference). The Council frames hybrid threats and toolboxes (including Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and cyber diplomacy mechanisms) as part of EU responses.
A republican perimeter posture should therefore treat the integrity of public reasoning as a security interest: not by censoring dissent, but by transparency, attribution standards, media resilience, and civic education.
II.3. Civic equality as security policy
Republicanism insists that deep internal inequality creates dependence, clientelism, and susceptibility to coercion (including via corruption). A credible posture thus includes anti-corruption enforcement, rule-of-law conditionality, and social investment that reduces “domination through dependency” inside Europe.
Pillar III - Economic Foundations: Anti-Coercion Credibility Through Structural Independence
Civic republican security requires structural independence: not autarky, but reduced vulnerability to choke points that enable arbitrary pressure.
III.1. Make the Anti-Coercion Instrument actionable, predictable, and solidarity-backed
The Anti-Coercion Instrument (Regulation (EU) 2023/2675) provides a legal pathway to respond to economic coercion.
A perimeter doctrine should add:
- a rapid solidarity compensation mechanism for targeted Member States/sectors (to prevent coercers from “splitting the Union”),
- and pre-committed escalation ladders (from diplomatic démarches to calibrated trade measures).
III.2. Strategic dependencies as republican vulnerabilities
Beyond trade tools, a doctrine should institutionalise “dependency reviews” in order to reduce strategic dependencies for:
- energy security (fossil and renewable energy, grid resilience),
- critical raw materials (CRMs) (lithium, cobalt, copper, nickel, graphite and rare earths),
- dual-use technologies (civilian and military industrial capability and capacity),
- and supply chains for defence production (supply chain control, logistic choke points, European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP)).
Investment screening is part of this architecture (Regulation (EU) 2019/452).
III.3. Defence-industrial capacity as a public good
Recent EU initiatives - European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), the “Readiness 2030” framing, and Security Action for Europe (SAFE) - explicitly treat defence-industrial capacity and joint procurement as strategic priorities.
A republican approach insists on two constraints:
- industrial policy must remain subject to public interest standards (competition, anti-corruption, interoperability),
- and burden-sharing must be transparent to citizens (who pays, who benefits, what risks are assumed).
Pillar IV - Military Foundations: A Collective Defence Posture That Remains Civilian-Controlled
The EU is not (and should not pretend to be) a unitary state with a single army. But a perimeter posture requires credible, integrated capabilities to deter coercion and, if necessary, respond.
IV.1. A “layered” posture: homeland protection, neighbourhood stability, global commons
A credible doctrine distinguishes three defence tasks:
- Territorial defence and resilience (primarily national + NATO for many, but coordinated through EU solidarity mechanisms),
- Neighbourhood crisis response (where spillovers - refugee flows, instability, maritime insecurity - directly affect EU citizens),
- Protection of the commons (sea lanes, space assets, cyber infrastructure) where coercion is frequently applied.
IV.2. Making the Rapid Deployment Capacity politically usable
The Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) is described as enabling swift deployment of a modular force up to 5,000, with work under the Strategic Compass toward full operationalisation by 2025.
But republican credibility requires political usability: shared financing rules, pre-authorised enabling assets, and decision procedures that avoid paralysis while maintaining accountability.
IV.3. Capability development through EDF, PESCO, EPF - under a single strategic logic
The EU already has a triangle of instruments:
- European Defence Fund (EDF) for capability R&D and industrial cooperation (Regulation (EU) 2021/697),
- Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) for structured commitments among Member States,
- European Peace Facility (EPF) for financing Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) actions with military implications.
A perimeter doctrine should integrate them through a single planning cycle: threat-driven priorities, standardisation, stockpiles, and interoperability targets, published in a way citizens can contest and evaluate.
IV.4. SAFE and joint procurement as deterrence
Security Action for Europe (SAFE) institutionalises EU-level financial leverage for common procurement and industrial scaling. In republican terms, this is a mechanism to transform defence from a fragmented club good into a coordinated public good - if procurement is transparent, contestable, and tied to capability outcomes rather than rent-seeking.
5. Republican Guardrails: Preventing Europe’s Perimeter from Becoming Europe’s Empire
A civic-republican doctrine must explicitly constrain itself.
- International legality: Any collective defence posture must remain consistent with the UN Charter’s framework (especially the constraints on the use of force and the right of self-defence).
- No hierarchy over neighbours: The “perimeter” must be built through consent-based partnerships, enlargement where appropriate, and support for sovereign agency - not through client states or enforced alignment.
- No permanent emergency: Exceptional measures must be time-limited, reviewable, and contestable; secrecy must be justified, not presumed.
- Civic primacy: Military instruments must remain subordinate to political judgement about the common good; security must be articulated as protecting citizens’ equal standing, not as national prestige.
6. Objections and Republican Replies
Objection 1: “A European Monroe doctrine is inherently imperial.”
Reply: Historically, Monroe rhetoric easily slides into exclusionary spheres. A republican redesign rejects exclusivity and domination. The normative core is anti-coercion, not regional ownership: Europe’s claim is not to rule its neighbourhood, but to prevent others from coercively determining Europe’s civic fate.
Objection 2: “Militarisation undermines liberty.”
Reply: Civic republicanism agrees: unchecked security apparatuses are domination risks. The answer is not pacifist vulnerability (which invites external domination), but constitutionalised defence: parliamentary control, legal constraints, auditing, and civic contestation built into security governance.
Objection 3: “The EU lacks a single demos for such a posture.”
Reply: Republicanism does not require a unitary national identity; it requires institutions that allow those affected to contest decisions and hold power to account. A multi-level republican design can be legitimate if it ensures that Europeans can authorise, review, and correct security policy through both EU and national democratic channels.
Conclusion: A (European) Republic That Refuses Dependency
From a civic-republican perspective, European security is not primarily about status or geopolitical vanity. It is about preventing a condition in which Europeans must live under the shadow of others’ arbitrary notice - military intimidation, economic coercion, infrastructural sabotage, or manipulation of public reason. The EU already possesses meaningful components of an anti-coercion and collective defence posture: treaty solidarity and mutual assistance clauses, the Strategic Compass and Rapid Deployment Capacity, the Anti-Coercion Instrument, investment screening, industrial and financing mechanisms (EDF, EDIS, SAFE), and enabling frameworks (PESCO, EPF).
What is still required is republican synthesis: a constitutional and civic architecture that makes these tools jointly credible, democratically controlled, and normatively disciplined. A European Security Perimeter Doctrine, so conceived, is not a call for empire. It is a doctrine of non-domination through lawful, contestable, solidarity-based capacity - the minimum foundation for an EU that can genuinely “take care of its citizens” in a coercive world.
Cicero in De Officiis (1:22): "non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici".
Bibliography (selection)
EU law and policy documents (primary)
EU. Treaty on European Union, Article 42. (12016M042 - EN - EUR-Lex - European Union).
EU. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 222. (12016E222 - EN - EUR-Lex - European Union).
EU. Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 (Anti-Coercion Instrument). (32023R2675 - EN - EUR-Lex - European Union).
EU. A Strategic Compass for security and defence - The Strategic Compass provides guidance and a common vision for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030. (EU Council approval March 2022).
EU. EEAS: EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (up to 5,000; operationalisation by 2025).
EU. EEAS. Information Integrity and Countering Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference (FIMI).
EU. Regulation (EU) 2021/697 (European Defence Fund). (32021R0697 - EN - EUR-Lex - European Union).
EU. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (European Peace Facility). (32021D0509 - EN - EUR-Lex - European Union).
EU. Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 (PESCO). (32017D2315 - EN - EUR-Lex - European Union).
EU. European Commission / High Representative: EDIS | Our common defence industrial strategy (March 2024).
EU. Council: SAFE instrument adoption - SAFE: Council adopts €150 billion boost for joint procurement on European security and defence (May 2025).
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